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Cynthia M. Ohlenforst * and Jeff W. Dorrill**
I. SALES TAx
A. Application of the Tax
AXPAYERS were %generally unsuccessful in the appellate cases de-
cided during the survey period.*** Hammerman & Gainer, Inc. v.
Bullock I is the only reported case during the survey period to deal
with a tax on services. This case is significant primarily for its substantive
analysis of insurance service and for its emphasis on the importance of the
comptroller's administrative interpretations in the context of Texas tax on
insurance services.2 Its holding that the Administrative Procedure and
Texas Register Act as in effect at the time of the suit3 authorized a taxpayer
to test the validity of a tax statute by a declaratory judgment action is also
noteworthy.4 Relying on the statutory provision that excludes "insurance
coverage for which a premium is paid"5 from the definition of taxable insur-
ance services, 6 appellants argued unsuccessfully that the charges to regulated
insurance carriers for claims adjustment are ultimately borne by the pre-
mium payor, so that the claims adjustments services constitute services that
are part of insurance coverage for which a premium is paid and are therefore
nontaxable.7 The court looked to the statutory language,8 the challenged
* B.A., Loyola University; M.A., University of Dallas; J.D., Southern Methodist Uni-
versity. Partner, Hughes & Luce, Dallas, Texas.
** B.B.A., J.D., Baylor University. Attorney at Law, Hughes & Luce, Dallas, Texas.
* Cases, regulations and other developments that fell within this survey period but were
included in last year's survey article are not included in this article. See Ohlenforst & Dorrill,
Taxation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 44 Sw. L.J. 651, 654 (1990) [hereinafter Ohlenforst &
Dorrill, 1990 Survey].
1. 791 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
2. See TEx. TAx CODE ANN. §§ 151.0039 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (defining "insurance
service"); 15 1.0101 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (insurance services taxable as of October 1, 1987).
3. See Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 12 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (Adminis-
trative Procedure and Texas Register Act section authorizing declaratory judgment suits).
The Tax Code now specifically prohibits declaratory judgment suits to contest the validity of a
tax. See TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 112.108 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
4. 791 S.W.2d at 331. Comptroller had argued that TEx. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 112.001-
.156 (Vernon 1982 and Vernon Supp. 1991) (protest suit provisions of the Tax Code) provided
the exclusive means of contesting the validity of taxing statute.
5. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0039(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
6. Id. § 151.0039(a).
7. 791 S.W.2d at 332.
8. TEx. TEx CODE ANN. §§ 151.0039(a) & (b) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
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administrative rule,9 and a recent attorney general opinion I0 to support its
conclusion that the exclusion for coverage for which a premium is paid is
meant to exclude only transactions that consist of a payment for insurance
and not the expenditures for which the premium is ultimately used."I
Southwest Airlines Co. v. Bullock 12 also addressed both substantive and
procedural issues. Southwest Airlines argued that a statutory exemption
from sales and use tax for property brought into the state for "use as a li-
censed and certificated carrier"'13 exempted from taxation the business entity
using the aircraft rather than only the aircraft.' 4 The airline argued that
virtually all personal property used in the airline's business was therefore
exempt.15 The court, however, upheld the comptroller's administrative in-
terpretation,' 6 and further held that the exemption as then in effect 7 for
aircraft component parts did not extend to "passenger convenience items"
such as pillows and blankets.' 8 The court also overruled Southwest's points
of error with respect to the lower court's conclusions that hydraulic fluid
and other items were taxable maintenance items rather than exempt repair
or replacement parts, 19 and that neither mobile baggage equipment nor
plastic cups used by the aircraft were exempt.20
The court's reliance on administrative interpretation is of more impor-
tance to most taxpayers than is the court's aircraft-specific holding. South-
west argued that the trial court erred in accepting evidence of the
comptroller's unpublished policy interpretations.2' Based in part on its rea-
soning that the comptroller's position is expressed in documents that are
made available for public inspection, 22 even if not "published," the court not
only agreed that the testimony of comptroller representatives was accepta-
ble, but also gave significant weight to administrative interpretation. 23
9. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.355 (1989) (specifically including activities to adjust losses
as taxable).
10. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-1016 (1989).
11. 791 S.W.2d at 333. The court specifically concluded, "if the Comptroller's interpreta-
tion of the scope of insurance services is reasonable, in that it harmonizes with the statute, then
this Court is bound to accept his interpretation regardless of the possible existence of other
reasonable interpretations." Id.
12. 784 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
13. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.330(c), as in effect for the years at issue, provided an
exemption for the use of certain tangible personal property "moved into this state for use as a
licensed and certificated carrier of persons or property." 784 S.W.2d at 566.
14. 784 S.W.2d at 568.
15. Id.
16, Id.; see 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.297 (1989) (rule with respect to carriers) (amend-
ments proposed Dec. 7, 1990, 15 Tex. Reg. 7010).
17. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.328(a)(1) (Vernon 1982). This exemption was ex-
panded in 1989. See Ohlenforst & Dorrill, 1990 Survey, 44 Sw. L.J. 651, 654 (1990), for a
description of the 1989 revisions to this section.
18. 784 S.W.2d at 569.
19. Id. at 569-70 (relying heavily on fact findings by the lower court).
20. Id. at 570-72.
21. Id. at 566-67.




South Texas Chlorine, Inc. v. Bullock 24 affirmed a lower court summary
judgment holding that a taxpayer who purchased empty containers, filled
them with chlorine gas, and leased the containers in conjunction with sales
of the gas was liable for use tax (as opposed to sales tax), and that the ex-
emption from sales tax for certain containers was inapplicable.2"
As in past years, significant issues were resolved in unreported opinions.
Bullock v. Foley Brothers Dry Goods Corporation,26 for example, reversed a
lower court holding that the comptroller could not proceed against Foley as
a customer for sales tax that the seller had not collected. Foley had con-
vinced the district court that if the vendor failed to charge sales tax, the
comptroller could not assess the tax against the buyer. Another unreported
appellate case27 focused on whether certain property was consumed in con-
tracts to improve real property and was therefore exempt.28
United States Supreme Court decisions rendered during the survey period
are likely to have a profound effect on state tax administration. McKesson
Corp. v. Florida 29 and American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith 30 each
discuss the circumstances which require a state to refund payments made
pursuant to a statute that is later declared unconstitutional.
McKesson involved a Florida alcoholic beverage excise tax that discrimi-
nated in favor of Florida manufacturers. After a Supreme Court decision
held a tax similar to Florida's then-existing tax unconstitutional, 31 Florida
revised its tax scheme by enacting a slightly different tax. This tax was sub-
sequently found unconstitutional, on a retroactive basis, insofar as it dis-
criminated against interstate commerce. 32 In writing for a unanimous
Supreme Court, Justice Brennan concluded that when a state has placed a
taxpayer under duress to pay a tax, and relegated him to a post-payment
refund action, due process "obligates the State to provide meaningful back-
24. 792 S.W.2d 275 (rex. App.-Austin 1989, no writ).
25. Id. at 276.
26. No. 3-89-124 (Tex. App.-Austin, Dec. 19, 1990) (unreported). The appellate deci-
sion is consistent with Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. M-165 (1967) (sales tax can be collected from
either buyer or seller). The result in the overruled district court decision (No. 396,462, Dist.
Ct. of Travis County, 353d Judicial Dist., filed May 23, 1989), which surprised many tax
practioners, was based in part on the district court's conclusion that the comptroller may not
assess tax against venders who, without issuing resale or exemption certificates, purchase from
in-state sellers unless the comptroller first ascertains that the seller has not already remitted
the tax. The district court was also influenced by evidence that for many years the comptroller
had followed an audit procedure known as the "Texas Vender Policy" pursuant to which
auditors assessed tax against buyers only if the vendor was bankrupt or out of business or the
buyer had given the vendor a resale or exemption certificate and then used the property in a
taxable manner, and that Foley had relied to its detriment on that policy.
27. Bullock v. Morrison-Knudsen, Inc. (No. 3-88-268) (Tex. App.-Austin, Apr. 18,
1990) (unreported).
28. See TEx. TAX CoDE ANN. § 151.056 (Vernon 1982 & Supp. 1991) (exemption from
tax for certain property consumed in contracts to improve real property).
29. 495 U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2238, 110 L.Ed.2d 17 (1990).
30. 495 U.S. -1 110 S. Ct. 2323, 110 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990).
31. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).




ward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitutional deprivation." 33 Accord-
ing to the Court, such relief might take the form of refunds to certain
taxpayers, certain permissible forms of collection of back taxes from taxpay-
ers who had been favored by the unconstitutional tax, or some combination
of these methods. 34
In American Trucking a badly-split court concluded that the Arkansas tax
at issue should be treated as unconstitutional on a prospective-only basis,
and that prospective application was to begin from the date the tax was de-
termined to be unconstitutional by the lower court.35 The Court remanded
the case to the Arkansas Supreme Court to try again to craft appropriate
prospective relief.36
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Florida,37 a pending Supreme Court case, focuses
on the constitutionality of Florida's business situs intangible property tax,
and is likely to further refine the Court's analysis of states' ability to extend
their taxing jurisdiction. 38
The trend toward terse administrative decisions in comptroller hearings
continued, as the comptroller again issued hundreds of decisions. In one
administrative decision 39 dealing with the occasional sale exemption, the
comptroller acknowledged that the statutory exemption for a sale of an iden-
tifiable segment of a business4° can apply even if income and expenses attrib-
utable to the segment have not been separately accounted for,4 1 so long as
income and expenses could be separately calculated. The administrative law
judge concluded, however, that because the seller had no books and records
from which the income and expenses could be determined, the exemption
did not apply.42 Other administrative decisions refused to allow an occa-
sional sale exemption in circumstances in which the asset sold had not pro-
duced any income. 43
33. Id. at 2247.
34. Id at 2258.
35. American Trucking, 110 S. Ct. at 2335-36.
36. Id. at 2343. This case and McKesson could easily be the subject of a separate article.
Both decisions follow the test set forth in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), that
prospective-only relief for an unconstitutional tax is appropriate if the decision at issue estab-
lishes a new principle of law that overrules past precedent or is a case of first impression,
whether retrospective operation of the rule will further or retard its operation, and if equitable
factors favor prospective application. Notwithstanding the fact that this test has been in exist-
ence for some twenty years, an increasing number of current cases are focusing on whether
amounts paid pursuant to a tax that is subsequently declared unconstitutional may or must be
refunded. See, e.g., Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 497 U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 3202, 111 L.Ed.2d 734
(1990); National Mines Corp. v. Caryl, 497 U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 3205, 111 L.Ed.2d 740 (1990);
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, U.S. S. Ct. No. 89-680, 110 L.Ed.2d 637, cert.
granted (June 11, 1990).
37. No. 88-1847 (U.S.) (oral argument Nov. 6, 1990).
38. Ford challenged Florida's tax on Ford's accounts receivable arising from motor vehi-
cle financing. See Daily Tax Report at G-4 to -5 (BNA Nov. 7, 1990).
39. Comptroller Hearing No. 25,090 (Aug. 2, 1990).
40. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.304(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
41. Comptroller Hearing No. 25,090.
42. See also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.304(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (sale of an iden-
tifiable segment of a business constitutes an occasional sale).
43. See, e.g., Comptroller Hearing No. 26,410 (Oct. 3, 1990) (airplane used to transport
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The comptroller's success continued in his efforts to impose successor lia-
bility pursuant to section 111.020 of the Texas Tax Code." In one adminis-
trative decision the taxpayer franchisor argued that it had not purchased the
business and therefore could not be liable under section 111.020.4 5 The ad-
ministrative law judge found that the evidence did not support the taxpayer's
claim that it had merely terminated a franchise and leasing relationship
rather than repurchasing the franchise interests; therefore, the taxpayer was
held liable.
In Decision 24,67046 the comptroller imposed tax on a three-party trans-
action that was structured to rely on back-to-back exemptions. A bank sold
a boat to seller who purchased tax-free pursuant to a resale certificate. On
the same day, seller sold to buyer in a transaction intended to be tax-free on
the ground that the seller made only one sale during the relevant twelve-
month period. 47 The comptroller held that the seller's application for a sales
tax permit (sought by the seller in order to give a resale certificate) precluded
the seller's reliance on the occasional sales tax exemption.48
The comptroller denied an exemption for resale in Decision 26,08849 on
the ground that the taxpayer (which was in the business of providing tele-
communications services to its customers) did not transfer "the care, cus-
tody and control" of the purchased switching equipment to its customers as
part of providing telecommunications services.50 The decision highlights the
difficulty that taxpayers may face in trying to establish that tangible personal
property is transferred to customers as part of providing a taxable service.51
employees but not to produce income). This decision may represent the administrative lawjudge's belief that the airplane was never intended to function as a separate business segment
rather than a statement of a legal rule. See also Comptroller Hearing No. 25,368 (Jan. 17,
1990) (no occasional sale exemption because parties' agreement, which they had prepared
themselves, did not accurately reflect their intent. Kudos to the administrative law judge for
commenting that "[a]ttorneys, though much maligned in the media, do serve a necessary pur-
pose. Those who would substitute informal judgments for legal formalities frequently find
themselves subject to unforeseen risks and consequences."). Id.
44. See Tax. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.020(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (if a person liable for
taxes under Title II of the Tax Code "sells the business or stock of goods of the business or
quits the business," a successor buyer who fails to withhold the amount of the purchase price
necessary to cover the taxes will become liable to the extent of the purchase price); id.
§ 111.020(c) (procedure by which the purchaser of a business may request a certificate from
the comptroller that no taxes are due). Despite the protection offered by this provision, how-
ever, buyers and sellers are often reluctant to approach the comptroller's office asking for an
analysis of potential tax liability.
45. Comptroller Hearing No. 25,932 (March 26, 1990).
46. Comptroller Hearing No. 24,670 (Feb. 6, 1990).
47. See TEx TAX CODE ANN. § 151.304(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (exemption for one or
two sales during a 12-month period by a person who, inter alia, does not hold himself out as
engaging in the business of selling).
48. The statute specifically provides that the exemption for fewer than three sales in a year
is not available to persons who hold sales tax permits. Id. § 151.304(f). The facts presented at
the hearing indicate that the seller had applied for the permit the day before the sale; the seller
therefore may not have "held" a permit at the time of the sale.
49. Comptroller Hearing No. 26,088 (July 25, 1990).
50. The tax on telecommunication services was considered in several administrative hear-
ings, including Comptroller Hearing No. 25,426 (Nov. 30, 1989) (usage charges for connecting
mobile phone taxable).
51. Administrative rules with respect to taxable services make clear that resale exemp-
1991]
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Although there are still very few helpful administrative decisions constru-
ing the relatively new services taxes,52 decisions interpreting these services
taxes are becoming more common. As in the past, several administrative
decisions dealt with the difference between tangible personal property and
real property, a distinction that will remain particularly important in the
context of taxable services. In Decision 25,088,53 for example, the comptrol-
ler held that welding services on a drilling rig were taxable services for the
repair, remodeling, maintenance, and restoration of tangible personal prop-
erty since there was no evidence that the drilling rig was incorporated or
attached to realty in a manner that would cause it to become real property.
In Decision 24,97254 the comptroller held that, on the evidence presented in
that hearing, computer cabling installed in buildings under construction con-
stituted nontaxable improvements to real property rather than taxable sales
of tangible personal property. Several additional decisions focused on
whether property was used in manufacturing within the meaning of section
151.318 of the Tax Code.55 This is an inquiry that is likely to become a
frequently contested area as taxpayers seek refunds of sales taxes under this
newly effective provision. This section of the Code permits the taxpayers to
claim refunds for a portion of the sales tax paid on the purchase of certain
machinery and equipment used in manufacturing, processing, fabrication, or
repair of tangible personal property for ultimate sale.
The large number of administrative decisions issued every year is, in part,
a reflection of the varied areas of law that are involved in administrative
challenges each year, many of which are of interest primarily to specialized
groups of taxpayers. There are, for example, decisions that are of significant
interest to taxpayers in the business of leasing56 and to taxpayers with issues
tions apply to property sold as part of a taxable service only if the "care, custody, and control"
test is met. See 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.330(c)(1) (eff. Nov. 13, 1989, 14 Tex. Reg. 5786)
(one of several rules using this standard).
52. Many taxable services have been taxable in Texas only since 1987. See generally
Ohlenforst & Dorrill, 1990 Survey, 42 Sw. L.J. 633, 636-40 (1988). It is only recently that
audits concerning these taxes are reaching the administrative hearing and litigation stage.
53. Comptroller Hearing No. 25,088 (Mar. 14, 1990).
54. Comptroller Hearing No. 24,972 (Jan. 4, 1990).
55. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
56. See Comptroller Hearing No. 21,106 (Aug. 21, 1990, reversing original decision issued
Aug. 23, 1989). This decision is of particular interest; the original decision (cited at Ohlenforst
& Dorrill, supra note 17, at 653 n.21) held that tax was accelerated following an assignment of
taxpayer's operating leases, on the ground that the assignment did not constitute a loan. The
decision upon rehearing concluded that the facts were virtually identical to Comptroller Hear-
ing No. 21,992 (Aug. 25, 1989) (also cited at Ohlenforst & Dorrill, supra note 17, at 653 n.21),
and therefore altered the result of the case "without endorsing the reasoning therein." The
administrative law judge further concluded on rehearing that taxpayer was in some circum-
stances not relieved of the responsibility to collect tax on the post-assignment lease payments.
See also Comptroller Hearing No. 25,901 (May 24, 1990) (assignment of lease payments as
collateral for a nonrecourse loan, when a taxpayer is "relieved from all liability beyond the
value of the lease and equipment pledged as collateral is tantamount to factoring the lease,"
(emphasis in original) so that tax was due on all remaining lease payments). Cases are also
pending in district court regarding lease factoring; Eg., Lenier Business Products, Inc. v. Bul-




relating to certain exemptions for the use of gas and electricity.57 Many
decisions, however, raise procedural or detrimental reliance issues that are of
broader interest. Decision No. 25,856,58 for example, provides an interesting
discussion of a taxpayer's detrimental reliance on an administrative rule
that, according to the administrative law judge "was not incorrect, but...
did not go far enough." 59 The administrative judge in that decision noted
that provisions such as the rule at issue "do nothing to clarify the tax stat-
utes, and do not aid businesses in understanding the law." In that case, as in
others, the administrative law judges appear more sympathetic toward a det-
rimental reliance argument when the law itself is unclear.6° Although the
decisions on detrimental reliance continue, appropriately, to be fact-based,
and although the standards cited are not always precisely the same, decisions
in this area offer some guidance to taxpayers as to whether their reliance on
comptroller advice offers a defense to a failure to pay the taxes.61
B. Legislative and Regulatory Developments
The school funding issue that dominated multiple special sessions of the
legislature gave rise to concerns that the legislature might further expand the
sales tax base as a partial solution for the education problems. Legislators
settled, however, for increasing the state sales tax rate from six percent to six
and one-quarter percent.62
57. See Comptroller Hearing No. 25,187 (Feb. 12, 1990) (taxpayer's predominant use of
electricity, rather than the predominant use of his campground customers, determined that use
was commercial and therefore not exempt); Hearing No. 25,761 (Feb. 27, 1990) (use of elec-
tricity to maintain or prevent deterioration of plant is a nonexempt, commercial use).
58. Comptroller Hearing No. 25,856 (June 27, 1990).
59. Id The administrative law judge concluded that 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.297(c)(6)
(1989), which provided that sales tax is not due "on separately stated installation or delivery
charges" was misleading enough to justify the taxpayer's failure to realize that only charges for
deliveries that occurred after sale of the parts were exempt.
60. See also Comptroller Hearing No. 24,996 (Feb. 14, 1990) (determining that a tax-
payer's apparent misunderstanding of advice received from the comptroller was attributable to
the comptroller's confusing policy on the plant maintenance services at issue).
61. See also Comptroller Hearing No. 24,873 (Nov. 27, 1989) (accepting taxpayer's credi-
ble testimony as to reliance on oral information from comptroller employees and noting that
"[t]hough certain pronouncements in decisions dealing with 'detrimental reliance' may address
the evidence necessary to prove it, no rule has ever been adopted. Thus the matter of sufficient
proof has evolved case by case.") Id. This decision, like the ones cited above, appears to be
influenced by the fact that certain information in publications from the comptroller "did not
make it clear to the average businessman which, if any, of the labor or services performed"
were taxable. IA This decision observes that in order to prove detrimental reliance the tax-
payer must show that (1) he received specific, incorrect information; (2) the information came
from a comptroller employee authorized to give the information; (3) the employee was given
all the correct factual information necessary; (4) the taxpayer relied on the incorrect informa-
tion; and (5) the taxpayer suffered harm or damages). But see Comptroller Hearing No. 25,430
(Nov. 22, 1989) (there was "no doubt" that taxpayer relied on auditor's acceptance of tax-
payer's method of calculating tax on its inventory, but taxpayer was not harmed, as taxpayer
had been able to make lower bids because it did not build the tax into its bids and probably got
more business).
62. Act of June 7, 1990, ch. 5, (H.B. 6) 1990 TEx. SEss. LAW SERV. 41 (Vernon). Un-
codified § 1.02 of this bill includes an exemption from this rate increase for certain goods and
services purchased pursuant to a prior contract, thereby insuring that the comptroller's rule on
prior contracts, 34 TEx. ADMIN. CoDE § 3.319 (eff. Nov. 6, 1990, 15 Tex. Reg. 6197), will
1991]
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Although there were fewer regulatory amendments than during periods of
more significant legislative change, the ongoing process of amending regula-
tions continued during the survey period. 63 One of the relatively few signifi-
cant sales tax policy changes to be reflected in regulations amended during
the survey period concerns the comptroller's decision to rely on D. H.
Holmes Co. v. McNamara64 to justify extending the scope of the Texas use
tax. In D. H. Holmes the United States Supreme Court upheld Louisiana's
imposition of use tax on catalogs prepared and mailed by out-of-state com-
panies in circumstances where the vast majority of the catalogs were mailed
to Louisiana residents. 65 Comptroller representatives had indicated infor-
mally several months ago that the comptroller would apply the D. H,
Holmes rationale in collecting Texas use tax. The comptroller officially
amended the relevant administrative rule on use tax66 in December 1990, to
provide that use tax is due on taxable items purchased outside Texas by a
person engaged in business in Texas "if the taxable items are delivered at the
direction of the purchaser to recipients in Texas designated by the
purchaser." 67
Interpretation of the relatively new services taxes in Texas will be an
ongoing process. Because too few administrative challenges to these taxes
reached hearings to give rise to a significant body of administrative law
outside the regulations, the regulations continued to be the best source of
comptroller policy. The line between sales of services and sales of goods
continues to be a blurred one in many contexts and is likely to become more
important in the context of these services taxes. In one recently amended
rule,68 the comptroller provided that certain car repairs (such as battery and
shock absorber replacements) are to be treated as repair services rather than
as a sale of tangible personal property.69 As more and more distinctions like
this one are created, finding a consistent legal theory underlying the distinc-
tions between goods and services and between taxable services and non-taxa-
ble services may become more difficult. In addition, the overlap between the
new services taxes and formerly existing law is sometimes confusing, and
requires additional regulatory amendments to effect consistency between the
remain relevant during the coming year. See Comptroller Hearing No. 26,604 (Jan. 30, 1990)
regarding this rule.
63. Some comptroller rules were revised during the survey period to reflect 1989 legisla-
tive changes. See, e.g., 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.299 (eft. Oct 5, 1990, 15 Tex. Reg. 5502)
(rule on newspapers, magazines, publishers and exempt writings amended to interpret with
legislative amendment to TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.312 exemption for certain periodical
and writings published by a redegree, philanthropic, charitable, or certain other similar organi-
zations); see also Ohlenforst & Dorrill, supra note 17, at 654 n.35 (discussion of background
for legislative change); 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.329 (eft. Nov. 6, 1990, 15 Tex. Reg. 6197)
(guidelines under which eligible enterprise projects may apply for refunds of sales tax).
64. 486 U.S. 24, 108 S. Ct. 1619, 100 L.Ed.2d 21 (1988).
65. 486 U.S. at 33-34, 108 S. Ct. at 1625, 100 L.Ed.2d at 29.
66. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.346 (eff. Dec. 21, 1990, 15 Tex. Reg. 7029).
67. Id. § 3.346(b)(3) (proposed language at 15 Tex. Reg. 5668). This extension of Texas
use tax may be subject to challenge on the grounds that the Texas statutory language with
respect to use tax differs from Louisiana statutory language.
68. 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.290 (eft. Dec. 5, 1990, 15 Tex. Reg. 6748).
69. Id. § 3.290 (b)(2).
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old law and the new. For example, although the administrative rule on data
processing services7° has not been modified during the survey period, the
comptroller modified his rule on graphic arts. The modifications provide
that sales tax is due on charges for "furnishing original letters or other
printed material prepared by using word processing or other data processing
equipment. ' 71 This language would replace a specific statement that tax is
not due on charges for furnishing original letters or other printed materials
produced simultaneously with the original by data processing.72 The pro-
posed change is an example of the wide-reaching impact that the service tax
rules have on already existing rules (which are sometimes more clearly fo-
cused on end-products than on services).
The comptroller also amended the insurance services rule73 as it applies to
the taxability of certain services performed for self-insured entities and with-
drew a proposed change to the telecommunications rule74 that would have
included facsimile services within the definition of taxable telecommunica-
tion services.75 In other regulatory changes, the comptroller added substan-
tially to the rule concerning the phased-in exemption for manufacturing
machinery and equipment, 76 adopted an emergency rule to reinstate retroac-
tively the exemption for utilities used for lighting directly in manufacturing
areas,77 and amended the direct payment rule to reflect the reinstated exclu-
sion from tax for certain items held for shipment outside Texas. 78 The
comptroller has also proposed a further, well-justified modification to the
prior contract rule,79 which sets forth the comptroller's policy on exemption
from new taxes for goods or services provided pursuant to a contract that
was binding prior to the legislation enacting the taxes. This proposed change
allows contracts for goods or services "as needed" and contracts with an
indefinite term to qualify for the exemption.80 Prior administrative interpre-
tation excluded such contracts from qualifying for the exemption."'
II. FRANCHISE TAX
A. Liability for Tax- Doing Business in Texas
The comptroller suffered another significant defeat in Bullock v. House of
70. 34 Tax. ADMIN. CODE § 3.330 (ef. Nov. 13, 1989, 14 Tex. Reg. 5786).
71. 34 Tax. ADMIN. CODE § 3.312 (amendment proposed July 12, 1990, 15 Tex. Reg.
4195).
72. Section 3.312 appears in its proposed and current form at 15 Tex. Reg. 4195.
73. 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.355 (eff. May 2, 1990, 15 Tex. Reg. 2284).
74. 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.344 (rule as in effect; efi'. April 1, 1988, 13 Tex. Reg.
1342).
75. See 15 Tex. Reg. 1231 (proposed amendment withdrawn in March 1990) and 14 Tex.
Reg. 4294 (amendment proposed Aug. 15, 1989).
76. 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.300 (eff. Nov. 28, 1990, 15 Tex. Reg. 6600).
77. 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.295 (emergency rule eff. Sept. 12, 1990 through Jan. 10,
1991, 15 Tex. Reg. 5405).
78. 34 Tx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.377.
79. 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.319.
80. 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.376.
81. See 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.319(c)(3) & (5) (1989) (prior to cited amendment).
See Comptroller Hearing No. 24,604 (Jan. 30, 1990) (regarding the comptroller's rule).
1991]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Lloyd, Inc.,8 2 in which the Austin Court of Appeals held that a foreign cor-
poration that was not (and not required to be) qualified to transact business
in Texas, had no offices, property or employees in Texas, but did maintain
independent contractors in the state for the purpose of selling products, was
not required to pay Texas franchise tax.8 3 Section 171.001 of the Tax
Code8 4 imposes franchise tax on a corporation if it "does business" in
Texas.8 5 Prior to September 5, 1983, the comptroller defined "doing busi-
ness in Texas" as transacting "some substantial part of its ordinary business
in Texas."'8 6 Without legislative inspiration, the comptroller amended, in
1983, the administrative rule interpreting the doing business standard to pro-
vide that a corporation is doing business in Texas if it is transacting "some
part of its ordinary business in Texas."'8 7 The comptroller interpreted this
rule to cause corporations soliciting sales in Texas through independent con-
tractors to be subject to Texas franchise tax.8s Under the prior rule, the
activity would not result in a corporation's becoming subject to the franchise
tax.8 9
The taxpayer in House of Lloyd argued that the statutory phrase "does
business in this state" is ambiguous and should be interpreted strictly against
the taxing authority.90 Thus, the comptroller's long-standing interpretation
(from 1941 to 1983) of the phrase should be afforded considerable weight
since the legislature had repeatedly re-enacted section 171.001 without
change.9 ' The court agreed with the taxpayer's position, stating that the
legislatively approved interpretation of the "doing business" phrase by the
comptroller can be changed only if prompted by clear statutory authority.92
82. 797 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ pending).
83. Id. at 138.
84. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001 (Vernon 1982).
85. A corporation is also subject to Texas franchise tax if it is incorporated in Texas or is
qualified to do business in Texas. Id.
86. See Comptroller Hearing No. 10,216 (Aug. 19, 1981) (quoting Comptroller's rule
promulgated in 1975 with respect to "doing business" standard).
87. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.406(b) (1989) (eff. Sept. 5, 1983, 8 Tex. Reg. 3236). Prior
to this amendment, the "doing business" test under § 171.001 of the Tax Code and the "trans-
acting business" test under § 8.01 of the Texas Business Corporations Act were thought to
have similar meanings. The 1983 amendment made it clear that the comptroller intended the
"doing business" test to require a lower threshold of activities sufficient for the franchise tax to
be imposed on a foreign corporation than is necessary for a corporation to be required to
qualify to do business in Texas under the "transacting business" standard.




92. Id. at 137 (citing Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Calvert, 414 S.W. 2d 172, 180 (Tex.
1967)). Apparently in response to repeated challenges to the comptroller's interpretation of
the "doing business" test, which interpretation the comptroller again changed in 1986 to tax-
payers' further detriment, the comptroller obtained a legislative solution to the issue. In 1989,
§ 111.002(a) of the Tax Code was amended to provide that the comptroller may adopt, repeal
or amend rules that do not conflict with state laws or the Texas or United States constitutions
to reflect changes in the power of the state to collect taxes and enforce the provisions of Title 2
of the Tax Code due to changes in the constitution or laws of the United States and judicial
interpretations thereof. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.002(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991); see




B. Calculation of Taxable Capital
In Decision 24,16593 the comptroller ruled that a transfer of funds from a
wholly-owned subsidiary to its parent was a loan rather than a contribution
to capital. 94. In rejecting the taxpayer's position that the transfer was a con-
tribution, the comptroller stated that a transfer from a subsidiary to a parent
cannot be a contribution to capital because the subsidiary has no equity or
ownership interest in the parent.95
In the last several years, several comptroller's decisions considered
whether taxpayers were required to use push-down accounting96 with re-
spect to 1987 and prior report years.97 The comptroller continues to issue
administrative decisions providing that push-down accounting is required in
these report years when the taxpayer uses push-down accounting on its
books and records. 98 Although the challenge to the comptroller's position
on this issue in Southern Clay Products v. Bullock99 was unsuccessful (ap-
parently because the taxpayer failed to submit sufficient documentary evi-
dence of discriminatory application of the policy to a large class of other
individuals100), the taxpayer and the comptroller in Capital Cable Co. v. Bul-
lock 10 1 reached an agreement on this issue that resulted in a taxpayer
refund. 10 2
93. Comptroller Hearing No. 24,165 (Feb. 21, 1990).
94. Id.
95. Id The taxpayer's case probably suffered because it booked the transfer as an in-
tercompany account receivable rather than a capital contribution. Comptroller Hearing No.
24,165. During the survey period, the normal plethora of decisions considered whether a pur-
ported loan to a corporation by a related entity was, in fact, a capital contribution and there-
fore part of the recipient's taxable capital. See, e.g., Comptroller Hearing No. 25,280 (July 9,
1990) (ruling against the taxpayer and focusing on risk and economic reality); Comptroller
Hearing No. 24,768 (Dec. 21, 1989) (ruling in favor of the taxpayer and focusing on intent as
established by books and records); and Comptroller Hearing No. 23,613 (Aug. 22, 1989) (rul-
ing in favor of the taxpayer and focusing on economic reality).
96. Pursuant to the push-down accounting method, the value of a subsidiary's assets
equals the fair market value of such assets as determined by allocating to such assets the con-
sideration paid for the corporation by the new owner. See also Comptroller Hearing No.
20,278 (May 16, 1978) (discussion of push-down accounting method).
97. The determination of whether taxpayers are required to employ push-down account-
ing for report years after 1987 is governed by a different set of issues. In 1987, the Texas
legislature amended § 171.109(b) of the Tax Code to provide that if generally accepted ac-
counting principles (GAAP) are unsettled on an accounting practice for a particular purposes,
the comptroller may establish rules to specify the applicable accounting treatment. TEx. TAX
CODE ANN. § 171.109(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991). With respect to valuation of acquired corpo-
ration's assets, GAAP allows push-down accounting and historical cost accounting. Rule
3.391(c)(3) provides that if a majority of the voting stock of a corporation is acquired, the
acquired corporation's assets must be revalued using push-down accounting. 34 TEx. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.39 l(c)(3) (ef. Sept. 21, 1989, 14 Tex. Reg. 4599). Apparently, it is the comptroller's
position that GAAP is unsettled on the issue of valuing the assets of an acquired corporation.
98. See Comptroller Hearing No. 24,107-A (Dec. 18, 1989).
99. 753 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no writ) (discussed in Ohlenforst & Dor-
rill, 1990 Survey, 43 Sw. L.J. 579, 592-93 (1989)).
100. Id. at 784.
101. No. 426,893 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 126th Dist. of Texas, agreed final judgment




C. Allocation of Capital
The Austin Court of Appeals in Bullock v. Marathon Oil Co.10 3 held that
the comptroller's rule that treated receipts from barter exchange agreements
as gross receipts for purposes of calculation of franchise tax was invalid.104
During the 1987 franchise tax report period, Marathon Oil entered into
agreements whereby Marathon exchanged certain oil products for other oil
products.10 5 In 1987 the comptroller amended Rule 3.403106 to provide that
deliveries of property pursuant to exchange agreements results in receipts,
for franchise tax purposes. 10 7 This amendment reversed the comptroller's
long-standing interpretation that receipts from such exchange agreements
did not constitute receipts for franchise tax purposes.' 08 Marathon sued for
a declaratory judgment stating that the amendment was invalid. The court
ruled that sections 171.103 and 171.105 of the Tax Code, defining gross re-
ceipts as, inter alia, the "sale" of property and "other business," are ambigu-
ous. 10 9 In circumstances in which an administrative interpretation of an
ambiguous statute is in effect at the time the legislature amends the statute
(without making substantive changes), the legislature is deemed to have ac-
cepted the interpretation."10 Therefore, the comptroller could not change its
interpretation without legislative authorization."'
The comptroller ruled in Decision 25,039' 12 that receipts from merchan-
dise shipped by the taxpayer to duty-free stores or customs bonded ware-
houses located in Texas and then sold by the taxpayer at such locations and
sent to a common or contract carrier in Texas for delivery outside the
United States should be included as Texas receipts for purposes of determin-
ing the taxpayer's Texas gross receipts percentage."t 3 The taxpayer asserted
two theories explaining why such receipts should not be considered Texas
receipts. First, the specific locations where the sales took place are not sub-
ject to Texas jurisdiction. In rejecting the taxpayer's argument, the comp-
troller relied on the Texas Supreme Court's decision in General Dynamics
Corp. v. Bullock,' 4 in which the court held that receipts from sales made on
a federal enclave were subject to Texas franchise tax." 5 Second, the tax-
payer argued that treating such receipts as Texas receipts violates the United
103. 798 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, n.w.h.).
104. Id. at 357.
105. Id. at 355.
106. 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.403 (1989).
107. Id.
108. Marathon Oil Co., 798 S.W.2d at 357.
109. Id. at 358.
110. Id. at 357.
111. Id. After the amendment of Rule 3.403 in 1987, the Texas legislature added § 171.112
to the Tax Code, which provides that, except as otherwise provided, "a corporation must
calculate gross receipts in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles." TEx.
TAX CODE ANN. § 171.112(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991). It is thought that GAAP would exclude
receipts from such exchanges from gross receipts. Marathon Oil Co., 798 S.W. 2d at 357.
112. Comptroller Hearing No. 25,039 (Feb. 8, 1990).
113. Id.
114. 547 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1977).
115. Id. at 258.
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States constitution.116 The comptroller ruled that a tax on such receipts
does not place an undue burden on interstate commerce and does not violate
the Commerce Clause.1 17
In Decision 26,256118 the comptroller again interpreted the throw-back
rule,' 19 which provides that gross receipts from business done in Texas in-
clude receipts from sales of tangible personal property shipped from Texas to
a purchaser in another state in which the seller is not subject to taxation. 120
In determining whether the seller is not subject to taxation in another state,
the fact that the taxpayer did not actually pay taxes in such state does not
determine whether the taxpayer is subject to tax in such state for this pur-
pose because Texas law is generally employed to make such determina-
tion. 12 1 The taxpayer submitted into evidence travel receipts of employees
and invoices for sales to customers in the other states at issue in order to
demonstrate that the taxpayer was subject to tax in the states at issue.122
The travel receipts contained notations describing the purpose of the trips,
which apparently was sales solicitation. 123 In spite of this evidence, the
comptroller ruled that the taxpayer did not meet its burden of proof to estab-
lish that it was subject to tax in these states.124
In Decision 24,239125 the comptroller addressed whether the oil industry's
model form joint operating agreements created joint ventures or partner-
ships for franchise tax purposes. The taxpayer acquired oil and gas proper-
ties developed under the oil industry's three model form operating
agreements.' 2 6 The model agreements provide that the liability of the par-
ties is several, and that it is not the parties' intention to create a partner-
ship. 127 The taxpayer contended that its interests in such properties are
partnership interests, thus allowing the taxpayer to report its revenues from
116. Comptroller Hearing No. 25,039 (Feb. 8, 1990). In support of his position, the comp-
troller relied on Comptroller Hearing No. 11,083 (Jan. 12, 1984) (receipts from sales of mis-
siles to the United States Government were Texas receipts); and Bullock v. Enserch
Exploration, Inc., 614 S.W. 2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (receipts
from sales of natural gas to interstate pipeline companies, with delivery in Texas but ultimate
transportation outside Texas, were Texas receipts), cert denied, 455 U.S. 946 (1982).
117. Comptroller Hearing No. 25,039 (Feb. 8, 1990).
118. Comptroller Hearing No. 26,256 (Sept. 12, 1990).
119. See TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.103(1) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
120. IdL
121. 34 TEx ADMiN. CODE § 3.403(d)(1)(E) (eft. June 28, 1988, 13 Tex. Reg. 2971). The
comptroller pointed out, however, that although evidence of actual payment of tax to another
state is not required to prove that a taxpayer is subject to tax in another state, absence of such
proof weighs heavily against the taxpayer. Comptroller Hearing No. 26,256 (Sept. 12, 1990).
122. Id.
123. IdL
124. Id. Rule 3.406(c)(4) is quite clear in providing that solicitations by an employee in
Texas causes the employer to be subject to Texas franchise tax. See 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.406(c)(4)(eff..Dec. 28, 1987, 12 Tex. Reg. 4702). Thus, it is difficult to understand why the
comptroller ruled against the taxpayer, unless the comptroller did not believe that the travel
receipts (along with the notations) were credible evidence. See also Hearing No. 22,645
(1988) (similar decision; discussed in Ohlenforst & Dorrill, 1990 Survey, 44 Sw. L.J. 651, 660-
61(1990)).





the ventures on the basis of net revenues received.' 28 The comptroller con-
cluded that these model agreements do not create a partnership and the tax-
payer cannot report revenues based on net revenues.1 29 The comptroller
reached a contrary result in circumstances in which the parties entered into
a limited partnership agreement.130
D. Procedure
Decision 25,403131 addressed the ability of a corporation whose surplus is
less than $1 million to change from the GAAP method of accounting to the
federal income tax method of accounting. Section 171.109(c) of the Tax
Code, as amended and effective August 31, 1987,132 provides that a corpora-
tion whose surplus is less than $1 million, as determined pursuant to the
accounting method used to compute its federal income tax, may report its
surplus according to such federal income tax method.' 33 Rule 3.391,13
however, provides that the filing of a franchise tax report using either the
GAAP method or the federal income tax method shall constitute an irrevo-
cable election of such method for such reporting period. 13 The rule further
provides that a corporation eligible to use the federal income tax method
may change from the GAAP method to the federal income tax method no
more than once every four years.' 36 Rule 3.391 was adopted as an emer-
gency rule in January 1988, and the regular rule containing identical provi-
sions was adopted effective June 28, 1988.137 On its original 1988 return,
which was due March 15, 1988, the taxpayer used GAAP accounting' 38
The taxpayer later amended its return and used the federal income tax
method of accounting. 139 The comptroller ruled that the taxpayer was
charged with knowledge of the emergency rule when it filed its original re-
turn, and could not thereafter amend its return and elect a different account-
ing method. 140
128. Rule 3.403(e)(9) provides that receipts reflecting a corporate partner's share of the net
profits from a partnership or joint venture are gross receipts of the partner for franchise tax
purposes. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.403(e)(9).
129. Id. The comptroller relied on Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W. 2d 316
(Tex. App.-EI Paso 1982, no writ)(holding that such model agreements do not create a part-
nership or joint venture). Hearing No. 24,239 (Aug. 22, 1990).
130. Id. One other development with respect to the allocation of gross receipts is notewor-
thy. Two cases that were pending challenging the repeal of the optional three-factor formula
for determining a taxpayer's gross receipts percentage were nonsuited. See Delco Elec. Corp.
v. Bullock, No. 466,458 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 250th Judicial Dist. of Texas, order of
nonsuit entered Nov. 28, 1990); General Motors Corp. v. Bullock, No. 466,405 (Dist. Ct. of
Travis County, 250th Judicial Dist. of Texas, order of nonsuit entered Oct. 5, 1990).
131. Comptroller Hearing No. 25,403 (Jan. 29, 1990).
132. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(c) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
133. Id.
134. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.391 (ef. June 28, 1988, 13 Tex. Reg. 2970). The rule has
since been amended. See 14 Tex. Reg. 4599 (1989).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.391 (emergency rule elf. Jan. 1, 1988, 13 Tex. Reg. 160).
138. Comptroller Hearing No. 25,403 (Jan. 29, 1990).
139. Id.
140. Id. See Comptroller Hearing Nos. 25,689 (Feb. 22, 1990); and 25,137 (Sept. 25,
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In Decision 25,673 141 the comptroller addressed when the four year stat-
ute of limitations for filing claims for refund begins to toll in circumstances
when the taxpayer is granted an extension of time for the filing of the annual
franchise tax report. The taxpayer fied with the comptroller on June 13,
1989 an amended franchise tax report for its 1985 report year; based on the
amended report, the taxpayer was entitled to a refund.1 42 Franchise tax re-
ports for the taxpayer's 1985 report year were due March 15, 1985.143 In
accordance with the comptroller's rules, the taxpayer received an extensioi
of time to file its report, paid taxes on March 15 based on estimates of the
amount due, and filed its 1985 report and paid the additional tax due on
June 17, 1985, the date allowed under the extension. 144 Pursuant to Rule
3.410,145 if a corporation has been granted an extension to file its report,
such corporation must pay by March 15 the lesser of 90 percent of the tax
ultimately reported to be due or 100 percent of the tax paid the previous
year. 146
The taxpayer contended that the amended franchise tax report was filed
within the statute of limitations because it was fied within four years from
the date "the last day on which a payment is required ...,"147 which it
believed was June 17, 1985.148 The comptroller disagreed, although the ad-
ministrative law judge described the issue as a close case. 149 The comptrol-
ler concluded that for statute of limitations purposes the beginning date of
the period of limitation was March 16, 1985, which was the date that was
one day after the day on which payment of all or a substantial portion of the
1985 franchise tax was due.150
E. Regulatory Developments
Unlike prior survey periods, the comptroller made few changes to the
franchise tax rules during the survey period. One significant development
was the adoption of new permanent Rule 3.415,151 which sets forth permissi-
ble methods for estimating oil and gas reserve volumes for corporations us-
1990). In similar circumstances, the comptroller disallowed the taxpayers' refund claims.
Court cases are pending which should address the issue of the ability of the comptroller to
categorize as irrevocable the selection by taxpayer of accounting methods. See Weekly Homes,
Inc. v. Bullock, No. 483,836 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 299th Judicial Dist. of Texas, filed
May 4, 1990).
141. Comptroller Hearing No. 25,673 (Apr. 10, 1990).
142. Id
143. TEx. TAx CODE ANN. § 171.152(c) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
144. Comptroller Hearing No. 25,673.
145. 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.410 (eff. Nov. 9, 1987, 12 Tex. Reg. 3924).
146. Id.
147. TEx TAX CODE ANN. § 111.204 (Vernon 1982).
148. Comptroller Hearing No. 25,673. The taxpayer also unsuccessfully contended that its
position was supported by Rule 3.410(c), which provides that in circumstances in which an
extension is allowed, penalty and interest on late payments do not begin to accrue until the
date of the extended due date for the report. 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.410(c) (1989). Comp-
troller Hearing No. 25,673.
149. Id
150. Id
151. 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.415 (efi'. Dec. 1, 1989, 14 Tex. Reg. 6292).
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ing the successful efforts or full cost method of accounting in preparing their
franchise tax report. Under the successful efforts or full cost method of ac-
counting, the volume of oil and gas reserves is employed to determine the
amortization of intangible drilling costs.' 52 The rule allows four methods
for estimating the volume of oil and gas reserves: (1) methods used to com-
ply with Securities and Exchange Commission regulations; (2) an evaluation
by a registered engineer; (3) the method used for property tax purposes; and
(4) methods used by standard industry reserve estimating equations. 53
Rule 3.399154 was amended to implement legislation exempting corpora-
tions engaged exclusively in recycling sludge and corporations organized by
certain farmers' cooperatives from franchise tax.' 55 The rule also imposes
additional fling requirements on corporations seeking exemptions based on
federal status.'5 6 New rule 3.416,157 providing for a credit against franchise
tax for certain domestic title insurance companies, was adopted to imple-
ment legislation.' 5 8
New Rule 3.41715 9 sets forth rules with respect to close and S corpora-
tions seeking to calculate their franchise tax using the accounting method
used to determine federal income tax liability. '60 Also, the comptroller pro-
posed to amend rule 3.391161 to provide more specific guidance on circum-
stances in which amended franchise tax reports may be fled.' 62
III. PROPERTY TAX
A. Application of Tax
In Haney v. Cooke County Tax Appraisal District 163 the Fort Worth Court
of Appeals rejected the appraisal district's appraisal of property that was
determined by applying mass appraisal techniques. 64 The taxpayer success-
fully asserted that his real estate, consisting of a house, one acre of land, and
a car wash facility, was worth substantially less than the value derived by the
appraisal district, which utilized the sales prices of similar properties within
the same area to determine a value. The appraisal district overvalued the
property because it did not take into account the severe termite, settlement,
and other damage to the buildings on the property and the poor construction
quality of the buildings. 165 The court, while concluding that mass appraisals
are generally accepted techniques, held that the Tax Code requires that
152. Id. § 3.415(c).
153. Id, § 3.415(a).
154. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.399 (eff. Jan 23, 1990, 15 Tex. Reg. 117).
155. Id.
156. Id. § 3.399(e).
157. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.416 (ef. Jan 23, 1990, 15 Tex. Reg. 117).
158. Id. § 3.416(b).
159. 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.417 (eff. Oct. 4, 1990, 15 Tex. Reg. 5502).
160. Id.
161. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.391 (proposed Dec. 7, 1990, 15 Tex. Reg. 7011).
162. Id.
163. 782 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
164. Id at 352.
165. Id. at 350-52.
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property must be appraised based upon the individual characteristics that
affect the property's market value.1 66
. Exemptions
In City of Shenandoah v. Jimmy Swaggart Evangelistic Association 167 the
Beaumont Court of Appeals was called upon to address the propriety of the
district court's permitting a religious organization to present evidence as to
its tax-exempt status in a suit by the taxing authority for the collection of
delinquent ad valorem taxes. With respect to tax years 1982 through 1987,
the court held that section 42.09 of the Texas Tax Code168 prohibited the
organization from offering evidence of a claim of tax exemption in the taxing
jurisdiction's suit to collect tax. 169 Section 42.09 provides an exclusive list of
grounds of protest a property owner may raise in defense to a suit to enforce
collection of delinquent taxes; a claim of tax exemption is not a listed
ground.170 With respect to tax years 1980 and 1981, however, the court
concluded that the trial court properly permitted the organization to raise
the issue of tax exemption because the relevant statutes for such years did
not set out a procedure by which to request or claim tax-exempt status as a
religious organization.' 71 Section 1 of article 7150,172 which set forth the
application procedure in effect prior to the adoption of the Tax Code for
exemptions, was repealed on January 1, 1980. Section 11.43 of the Tax
Code, 173 setting forth the application procedure under the Tax Code for ex-
emptions, became effective on January 1, 1982.174 Because there was no set
statutory scheme for applying for exemptions for the 1980 and 1981 tax
years, the court held that due process required that the organization be per-
mitted to raise such issues in defense of the taxing authority's delinquent tax
suit for the 1980 and 1981 tax years.' 75
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals in Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v.
Hidalgo County Appraisal District 176 held that a corporation organized for
166. Id. at 352. See also Brazos County Appraisal Dist. v. Sun Operating Ltd. Partnership,
778 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ) (valuation of plant reduced ap-
proximately eight fold because taxpayer able to demonstrate that plant had no market value
except as salvage property).
167. 785 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, writ denied).
'168. TEXAS TAX CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
169. City of Shenandoah, 785 S.W.2d at 903.
170. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.09(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
171. City of Shenandoah, 785 S.W.2d at 904.
172. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7150 (Vernon 1960) (repealed 1979).
173. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.43 (Vernon 1982 and Supp. 1991).
174. City of Shenandoah, 785 S.W.2d at 904.
175. Id. at 904-05. In determining the validity of the taxing authority's argument that
there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion as to the percentage of property
that was entitled to a religious exemption in the 1980 and 1981 tax years, the court of appeals
ruled in favor of the taxpayer. City of Shenandoah, 785 S.W.2d at 905. The court's ruling was
apparently based on its inability to review the entire evidence presented to the jury. Part of the
evidence heard by the jury was a recording of a typical broadcast of the radio station. This
recording was played to the jury, absent objection by the taxing authority, without being for-
mally introduced into evidence. Therefore, the appellate court could not review the recording.
Id.
176. 783 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ granted).
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charitable purposes did not qualify as a tax-exempt charitable organization
for ad valorem tax purposes because the corporation did not demonstrate
that it pledged its assets for the performance of charitable functions. 177 In
order for an organization to be treated as an exempt charitable organization
under section 11.18 of the Tax Code,178 the organization must engage exclu-
sively in one or more of the charitable functions provided in section 11.18(d)
of the Tax Code. 179 Sharyland performed exclusively one of these functions
- acquiring, storing, transporting, selling or distributing water for public
use. In addition, section 11. 18(f)(1) of the Tax Code'80 provides that a qual-
ified organization is not exempt from property tax unless it pledges its assets
for use in performing the organization's charitable functions. 181 Although
Sharyland's articles of incorporation plovided that it was formed "for the
purpose of furnishing a water supply for general farm use and domestic pur-
poses to individuals. . ."1182 the court ruled that because nothing in Shary-
land's charter, bylaws, or other regulations made a pledge of its assets for
exempt uses, Sharyland did not meet the pledge requirement. 183
In Irving Independent School District v. Packard Properties, Ltd.t8 4 the
United States District Court held that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (FDIC), acting as a receiver for a savings and loan association, was
exempt from penalties and interest for nonpayment of property taxes be-
cause federal law exempts the FDIC from payment of such amounts. 85 Sec-
tion 1825(b)(3) of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989186 provides that the FDIC is exempted from all
state, county, or local taxes except to the extent such taxes are imposed ac-
cording to the value of real property owned by the FDIC. 187 The taxing
units argued that the penalty and interest impositions at issue are purely
compensatory in nature and are not penalties and interest within the mean-
ing of section 182i(b)(3). 8 8 The court reasoned that the impositions at issue
are on their face penalty provisions. t89
177. Id. at 300.
178. TEX. TAX CODE AN'N. § 11.18 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
179. Id.
180. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.18(f)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
181. Id.
182. Sharyland Water Supply Corp., 783 S.W.2d at 298.
183. Id. at 300. In support of its conclusion, the court cited North Alamo Water Supply
Corp. v. Willacy County Appraisal Dist., 769 S.W. 2d 690, 693 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1989, writ granted). In this case, an organization which apparently met all of the requirements
in § 11.18 of the Tax Code other than expressly pledging in its charter or bylaws its assets for
use in a charitable function was found to be nonexempt. Id.
184. 741 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
185. Id. at 124.
186. 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(3) (1989).
187. Id.
188. Irving Indep. School DisL, 741 F. Supp. at 123.
189. Id. at 124. The United States District Court relied on the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Texas, 229 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1956), cerL denied, 351 U.S. 907
(1956), which decided a similar question with respect to the predecessor statute of §§ 33.01
and 33.07 of the Tax Code (the penalty and interest provisions). TEX. TAX CODE ANN.




Two important cases decided during the survey period interpreted section
42.08 of the Tax Code.190 Section 42.08 provides that a taxpayer who ap-
peals an order of an appraisal review board to the district court must pay
taxes on the subject property in an amount equal to the greater of the
amount of taxes not in dispute or the taxes paid on the property in the pre-
ceding year.191 These taxes must be paid before the delinquency date or the
property owner forfeits the right to proceed to a final determination of the
appeal.192 Section 42.08(d) of the Tax Code193 provides, however, that if the
property owner "has substantially but not fully complied with.. ." section
42.08, the court must dismiss the case unless the property owner fully com-
plies with the court's determination 94 within thirty days.
In Wildwood Development v. Gregg County Appraisal District 195 the Tex-
arkana Court of Appeals addressed whether a taxpayer automatically for-
feited its right to a district court review of the appraisal review board's
determination of the taxable value of the taxpayer's property solely because
the taxpayer tendered to the district court amounts required to be paid pur-
suant to section 42.08(b) of the Tax Code 96 rather than tendering such
amounts to the proper taxing authority. The court held that the taxpayer
substantially complied with section 42.08 by tendering to the registry of the
court the taxes that were paid on the property in the preceding year (plus an
additional amount to avoid delay in the event the property was sold). 197
In ruling against the taxpayer, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held in Har-
ris County Appraisal District v. Consolidated Capital Properties IV 198 that
payment of taxes to a taxing authority two and one-half months after the due
date did not constitute substantial compliance' 99 with section 42.08 of the
Tax Code (as in effect for 1986 property taxes).200 The court reasoned that a
mandatory time requirement for appeal cannot be substantially complied
with; one either meets the time requirement or one does not.20 1 The
Amarillo Court of Appeals expressly disagreed with the Houston [lst Dis-
trict] Court of Appeals' holding in Harris County Appraisal District v. Krupp
Realty Limited Partnership,202 in which the court ruled that a late payment
190. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.08 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
191. Id § 42.08(b).
192. Id.
193. Id. § 42.08(d).
194. Id
195. 780 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ denied).
196. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.08(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
197. Wildwood Dev., 780 S.W.2d at 435. In 1989, the Texas legislature amended § 42.08 of
the Tax Code by, inter alia, adding a new subsection providing that a property owner that
pays the amount of taxes greater than that required under § 42.08(b) does not forfeit the prop-
erty owner's right to a final determination of the appeal by making the payment. Apparently,
§ 42.08, as in effect before this amendment, applied to the tax year at issue in Wildwood.
198. 795 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, writ denied).
199. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 795 S.W.2d at 41.
200. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.08 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (amended 1989).
201. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 795 S.W.2d at 41.
202. 787 S.W.2.d 513 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ).
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of taxes should not prevent the property owner from being considered to
have substantially complied with section 42.08.203
In City of Weatherford v. Parker County2" 4 the Texas Supreme Court held
that section 6.26 of the Tax Code,205 which provides procedures by which
voters of an appraisal district may elect to consolidate assessing and collec-
tion functions, is unconstitutional. 206 In rendering this decision, the court
relied on article III, section 64(a) of the Texas Constitution,20 7 which pro-
vides that the legislature by special statute may provide for consolidation of
governmental functions of any political subdivisions located within any
county. 20 8 Because section 6.26 of the Tax Code is a general statute, the
court ruled that the section is unconstitutional. 209
In Webb County Appraisal District v. New Laredo Hotel, Inc.210 the Texas
Supreme Court held that an appearance by the taxpayer, either personally,
by representative, or by affidavit, at a protest hearing is a jurisdictional pre-
requisite to an appeal to district court of an adverse determination of a prop-
erty valuation issue by the appraisal review board.21' The taxpayer
purchased a hotel and timely filed a protest after the appraisal district ap-
praised the hotel for over fifty percent more than the taxpayer paid for the
hotel. At the protest hearing the taxpayer neither appeared nor filed an affi-
davit. The taxpayer then filed suit in district court.
In addressing the taxing unit's motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction,
the court relied on section 41.45(b) of the Tax Code. 212 The section pro-
vides, in part, that the taxpayer may offer his evidence or argument by affida-
vit without personally appearing if he submits an affidavit to the board
before the hearing begins. 213 The taxpayer argued that this section does not
require an appearance by the taxpayer or an affidavit; rather, such appear-
ances are merely precatory.214 In support of its position, the taxpayer relied
on the statute's use of the word "may." In reversing the court of appeals,
the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the sentence at issue is meant to provide
203. Id. at 515.
204. 794 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. 1990).
205. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 6.26 (Vernon 1982 and Supp. 1991).
206. City of Weatherford, 794 S.W.2d at 35.
207. TEx. CONST. art III, § 64(a).
208. Id.
209. City of Weatherford, 794 S.W.2d at 34-35. The taxing authorities argued unsuccess-
fully that the provision in article III, § 64(a) of the Texas constitution providing that such
actions be taken pursuant to a special statute is merely permissive, not exclusive, and that the
legislature's broad authority under article III, § 1, and article VIII, § 18 of the Texas constitu-
tion to enact general laws gives the legislature the authority to enact the provisions set forth in
§ 6.26 of the Tax Code.
210. 792 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. 1990).
211. Id. at 955.
212. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.45(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
213. Id.
214. Webb County Appraisal Dist., 792 S.W.2d at 953. The dissent, however, agrees with
the taxpayer, and points out that when the Texas legislature intended appearance by a tax-
payer at a particular hearing to be mandatory, it employs mandatory language, such as "must




how the taxpayer may appear rather than giving taxpayers a choice of ap-
pearing or not.2 15
In overruling a prior Attorney General's opinion, the Attorney General
ruled that section 31.04 of the Tax Code2 16 does not forbid the establishment
of the delinquency date and the imposition of penalties and interest in cir-
cumstances in which no tax bill is sent because of an unknown address of the
taxpayer.217 Section 31.04(a) of the Tax Code provides that if tax bills are
mailed after January 10, the delinquency date is postponed until a specified
period after the notice is mailed.218 Section 31.04(e) provides that the post-
poned delinquency date is the date used to determine the amount of penalties
and interest charged for late payment.219 The Attorney General previously
had interpreted section 31.04 to provide that if no notice was mailed, a delin-
quency date is never established. 220 In reversing its opinion on the issue, the
Attorney General relied on section 3 1.01(g) of the Tax Code, which provides
that the failure to send a tax bill does not affect the validity of the tax, pen-
alty, or interest.2' The Attorney General interpreted section 31.04 not to
conflict with section 31.01 of the Tax Code2 2 by reading section 31.04 to
govern only in instances in which a tax bill can be sent but is mailed late.223
D. Legislation
In 1989, the voters of Texas approved a constitutional amendment (com-
monly called the freeport exemption) exempting from ad valorem taxation
certain goods, wares, merchandise, other tangible personal property, and
ores, other than oil, natural gas, and other petroleum products, that are lo-
cated in Texas for no longer than 175 days.224 The law allowed counties,
common or independent school districts, junior college districts, and munici-
palities, including home-rule cities, to tax freeport goods for the tax year
1991 and beyond if official action to tax such property was taken before
April 1, 1990.225 In spite of the voters' approval of the freeport exemption,
215. Webb County Appraisal Dist. v. New Laredo Hotel, Inc., 792 S.W. 2d 952, 935 (Tex.
1990). The taxpayer also argued that Keggereis v. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist., 749 S.W. 2d
516 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ), provided support for its position. Id at 954. The
court in Keggereis held that the denial of a hearing can be rectified by a new trial. The Texas
Supreme Court, however, denied that the Keggereis case had any relevance to the issue at
hand. Id. In the case at issue, the taxpayer was not denied a hearing; rather, a hearing was
held but the taxpayer chose not to appear. Id.
216. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 31.04 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
217. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-1192 (1990).
218. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 31.04(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
219. Id. § 31.04(e).
220. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. 89-60 (1989)(overruled 1990).
221. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 31.01(g) (Vernon 1982 and Supp. 1991).
222. Id. § 31.01.
223. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-1 192 (1990). The Attorney General also concluded that
a contrary reading of § 31.04 would conflict with § 33.04 of the Tax Code, which provides that
a tax collector's only notification duty to a delinquent taxpayer is by newspaper if the tax-
payer's address cannot be determined. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.04 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-I 192 (1990).
224. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-j. The Texas legislature added § 11.251 to the Tax Code
to implement this constitutional amendment.
225. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-j(b). If official action was taken before January 1, 1990,
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according to a State Property Tax Board survey, of the 2,333 counties,
school districts, municipalities and college districts reporting to the board
their actions on the freeport exemption, almost 75 percent took official ac-
tion to tax freeport goods.226
IV. OTHER SIGNIFICANT CHANGES: NEW SUCCESSOR LIABILITY, NEW
PROCEDURE AND NEW COMPTROLLER
Successor liability continues to be an increasingly real risk for Texas enti-
ties. Although the Tax Code formerly held successors liable only with re-
spect to sales tax,227 legislative changes made during 1989 extended the
scope of successor liability to other taxes, including franchise taxes. 228 Re-
cent administrative decisions (including those discussed above)229 reaffirm
that taking over substantially all the assets of a pre-existing business can
result in unexpected liability for purchasers.
The law has long provided that corporate officers may become liable for
debts of the corporation, including taxes, in circumstances in which the cor-
porate charter is forfeited for failure to pay taxes. 230 In addition, the attor-
ney general has recently been successful in asserting that corporate officials
may be liable for corporate sales taxes in circumstances in which the corpo-
ration has collected the sales taxes but failed to pay them over to the state.231
Although there are no reported decisions on this particular issue, some of
the recent cases are on appeal and a decision may be reported during the
1992 survey period.
The comptroller has made further efforts to protect the state from delin-
quent taxpayers by revising the administrative rule on bond or other securi-
ties for delinquent taxes to specify that a bank letter of credit is acceptable
security only when deemed by the comptroller to be "sufficient in amount
and secure." 232
Two court cases addressed the proper forum for a taxpayer's challenge of
a Texas tax. In McQueen v. Bullock 233 the taxpayer filed a request for a
preliminary injunction in Federal District Court to stay enforcement of un-
paid diesel fuel taxes due under the Texas Tax Code. Concluding that the
taxpayer would have been able to challenge the constitutionality of the tax in
the property could also be taxed for the 1990 tax year. A taxing authority may subsequently
rescind its action to tax freeport goods, but failure to tax such property by May 30, 1990, or a
rescission of an action to tax such property, is irrevocable. Id.
226. STATE PROPERTY TAX BOARD FREEPORT SURVEY, STATE PROPERTY TAX BOARD
(1990). This survey is available from the State Property Tax Board. The survey lists how each
reporting taxing unit acted on the freeport exemption. Almost 85 percent of school districts
elected to tax freeport goods. Approximately 78 percent, 63 percent and 81 percent of coun-
ties, municipalities, and college districts, respectively, elected to tax freeport goods. Id.
227. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.613 (Vernon 1982) (repealed 1987).
228. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 112.020 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
229. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
230. See, TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.255 (Vernon 1982).
231. Stalarow v. Texas, appeal pending, No. 3-90-225 CV (Tex. App.-Austin) (district
court judgment entered July 31, 1990).
232. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.327 (eff. Sept. 18, 1990, 15 Tex. Reg. 5062-63).
233. 907 F.2d 1544 (5th Cir. 1990).
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district court, without having to first pay the tax, the court found that the
taxpayer had a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy and was therefore pre-
cluded by the Tax Injunction Act234 from bringing suit in Federal District
Court.235
The taxpayer in Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. Macha236 chal-
lenged on due process grounds the Alcoholic Beverage Commission's sus-
pension of a liquor permit. The case is interesting for its holding that section
112.001 of the Tax Code237 did not bar jurisdiction in the District Court of
Amarillo; the court concluded that the taxpayer's suit was not a "taxpayer
suit" within the meaning of section 112.01 since Macha had based his claims
on due process grounds and not on tax issues.238
A new rule dealing with discovery in connection with an administrative
hearing239 specifically allows certain discovery, but limits each party to only
two sets of interrogatories, each of which may require no more than thirty
answers (unless the parties agree otherwise).24° The rule affirmatively notes
that an administrative law judge may subpoena witnesses, commission oral
depositions, and require entry on any party's premises "for the purpose of
doing any act or making any inspection not protected by privilege and rea-
sonably calculated to lead to the discovery" of material evidence.24' These
changes are likely to make the administrative process more thorough, but
also more complex and possibly more expensive, than it has traditionally
been. On the other hand, the service rule has been relaxed to allow service
by facsimile transmission.242
One of the most significant changes in the administration of Texas taxes is
the change in the office of the comptroller. John Sharp became comptroller
in January 1991 after Bob Bullock's sixteen year tenure as comptroller.
Sharp quickly issued an operational directive that reorganized the agency
into four functional areas: tax administration, fiscal management, revenue
administration, and central administration. Although there have been sig-
nificant personnel changes in the comptroller's office, many experienced
comptroller representatives remain on staff. As in the past, the comptroller's
office is expected to be a significant legislative influence. The legislature is
almost certain to enact substantial legislative tax changes during the coming
234. 28 U.S.C. § 1341.
235. McQueen, 907 F.2d at 1546-50.
236. 780 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1989, writ denied).
237. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 112.001 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (providing that courts of
Travis County have "exclusive, original jurisdiction of a taxpayer suit brought under this
chapter.")
238. "Nowhere in his pleadings did Macha allege the actual tax assessment was incorrect
or that its collection ... was unlawful .... It is clear that Macha pleaded classic due process
issues, not tax issues." Macha, 780 S.W. 2d at 941. Macha's victory was a hollow one; the
Court ultimately concluded that summary suspension of Macha's license did not violate direct
due process. Id. at 944.
239. 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 1.33 (eff. April 27, 1990, 15 Tex. Reg. 2169) (text of rule
appears at 15 Tex. Reg. 1228).
240. Id § 1.33(e).
241. Id.
242. 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 1.32 (eff. March 29, 1990, 15 Tex. Reg. 1516).
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survey period; both those changes and the regulatory changes they necessi-
tate will play an important part in developing the Texas tax system.
